Past research has linked action orientation to intuitive affect regulation (Koole & Jostmann, 2004; Kuhl, 1981 
Subliminal Affect Regulation 6 to as state orientation. Taken together, action versus state orientation are mutually exclusive regulatory modes that become triggered under conditions of worsened basic affect.
Whether a person is more likely to become action-oriented or state-oriented in response to worsened basic affect depends in part on stable individual differences (Kuhl, 2000) . Based on their prior experiences with situations that cause significant changes in basic affect (i.e., demanding or threatening situations), some individuals may have learned to react in a predominantly action-oriented manner under conditions of worsened basic affect. By contrast, other individuals may have developed a tendency to react in a state-oriented manner when basic affect becomes more negative. In line with this reasoning, Kuhl (1981 Kuhl ( , 1994 ) developed a self-report scale to assess individual differences in action versus state orientation. Based on their scores, some people can be characterized as predominantly state-oriented, whereas others can be characterized as predominantly action-oriented (for reviews and construct validity, see Diefendorff, Hall, Lord, & Strean, 2000; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994) .
Research has gathered ample evidence that individual differences in action versus state orientation are closely linked to intuitive affect regulation. A first line of research has addressed the physiological and behavioral consequences of intuitive affect regulation. For instance, Heckhausen and Strang (1988) observed increased physiological response (i.e., lactate concentration) and decreased athletic performance among state-oriented basketball players under performance pressure, whereas action-oriented players displayed no such effect in response to performance pressure. In a similar vein, Kuhl (1981) found performance decrements on a complex cognitive task after repeated failure experiences among state-oriented but not among action-oriented participants.
Furthermore, a negative mood impaired complex coherence judgments among stateoriented but not among action-oriented individuals (Baumann & Kuhl, 2002) . Finally, Jostmann and Koole (2005) demonstrated that the induction of mild stress diminished cognitive control, as indicated by the performance on the Stroop color naming task and related paradigms, among state-oriented individuals but not among action-oriented individuals.
Subliminal Affect Regulation 7 A second line of research has focused more directly on the affective consequences of action orientation. Specifically, action-oriented individuals reported less unpleasant feelings in response to repeated failure experiences (Brunstein & Olbrich, 1985) . In a similar vein, action-oriented individuals showed less depressive symptoms compared to state-oriented individuals, especially when levels of stress were high (Rholes, Michas, & Shroff, 1989) . Furthermore, increases in action orientation predicts whether phobic patients can overcome their phobic fears (Schulte, Hartung, & Wilke, 1997 ). Koole and Jostmann (2004, Study 1) examined the temporal dynamics of affect regulation in action-versus state-oriented individuals. In line with prior research (e.g., Brunstein & Olbrich, 1985) , action-oriented participants displayed significant downregulation of tense mood after the induction of mild stress. More important, however, this down-regulation was not so much apparent immediately after the induction of stress, but rather when moods were assessed 10 minutes afterwards. No similar decreases in tension were found when no stress was induced or among state-oriented participants. This finding supports the notion that action orientation entails efficient downregulation rather than a decreased sensibility towards aversive affect.
Finally, research has begun to investigate how action orientation regulates basic affective reactions without relying on explicit affect measures. Specifically, Koole and Jostmann (2004, Study 2) examined the effects of action orientation in an affective Simon task. In this task, participants were required to provide a positive or negative response to a target stimulus on the basis of a non-affective stimulus feature (e.g., grammatical status). Although the valence of the target stimulus was irrelevant and should be ignored during the task, participants displayed an "affective Simon effect" (De Houwer & Eelen, 1998) , i.e., they gave faster responses and made less errors when the valence of the target stimulus was congruent with the valence of the response. However, when the affective Simon task was preceded by the induction of mild stress, action-oriented participants were faster and made less errors compared to state-oriented participants on trials that required them to give positive responses to negative targets. This effect was interpreted as an up-regulation of worsened basic affect evoked by the prior induction of Subliminal Affect Regulation 8 mild stress. Taken together, these findings suggest that action orientation can regulate basic affective reactions. It remains to be seen, however, whether action orientation can also regulate basic affective reactions that are triggered subliminally.
The Present Research and Hypotheses
We designed the present research to examine the link between action orientation and regulation of subliminally triggered basic affect. To address this issue, we used a subliminal parafoveal priming paradigm (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996) to prime actionoriented and state-oriented participants with schematic drawings of angry, neutral, or happy human faces (Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001) . These stimuli are displayed in Figure 1 .
We assumed that the schematic faces have an intrinsic affective value to people that is similar for action-and state-oriented individuals. To test this assumption, we conducted a pilot study (N = 59). In this study, action-oriented and state-oriented participants indicated to what extent they perceived the happy, neutral, and angry faces as being negative, disapproving, and aggressive (1 = not at all, 9 = very much). Actionoriented and state-oriented participants' evaluations of the happy and angry faces did not differ, all Fs < 1. Furthermore, the two groups evaluated the neutral face similarly as negative and disapproving, Fs < 1. The only statistically detectable difference lies in the perceived aggressiveness of the neutral face, F(1, 57) = 4.85, p < .05. State-oriented participants found the neutral face more aggressive than action-oriented participants, M = 5.00 vs. M = 3.97, respectively. Overall, we concluded that action-oriented and stateoriented individuals do not differ in their evaluation of the prime stimuli.
In the parafoveal priming task, participants were subliminally exposed to angry, or neutral, or happy schematic faces. The exposure time for each face was 30 ms, which Subliminal Affect Regulation 9 has been shown to be below the level of conscious awareness in this task (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996) . After the subliminal priming task, participants completed a preference judgment task to measure basic affect (Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988) .
Our main hypothesis was that action orientation would regulate the effects of subliminal affective priming on basic affective reactions. More specifically, we expected that subliminal affective primes would evoke congruent reactions among stateoriented participants, such that subliminal priming of angry faces would lead to lower basic affect compared to subliminal priming of happy faces. By contrast, we expected no such priming effects among action-oriented participants. As regards subliminal priming of neutral faces, we expected that basic affective reactions in response to those faces would lie in between responses to angry and happy faces. 
Method

Participants and Design
Procedure
Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were led to individual cubicles each containing an Apple Macintosh (iMac) computer. Experimental instructions were administered via computer-program. Participants were first informed that they would complete a series of unrelated tasks, which were ostensibly administered together for efficiency reaSubliminal Affect Regulation 10 sons. Participants first completed a study on 'personality', which contained a Dutch translation of the Action Control Scale (ACS90; Kuhl, 1994) . The ACS90 served as our measure of individual differences in action versus state orientation. On completion of the ACS90, participants moved on with a parafoveal priming task, in which happy, angry, or neutral faces were presented outside of conscious awareness. Participants were told that very brief flashes would appear at unpredictable places and times, and that their task was to decide whether a flash appeared on the left side or the right side of the screen. Immediately after the parafoveal priming task, participants completed a preference judgment task to measure basic affect. Next, participants moved on to some unrelated filler tasks, which lasted about fifteen minutes. Finally, participants continued with a funneled debriefing procedure (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996) , after which they were thanked for their efforts and paid.
Independent Variables
Action Orientation
The ACS90 (Kuhl, 1994) measures two interrelated but conceptually independent types of action versus state orientation: first, the capacity to initiate goal-directed action under high demands (demand-related action orientation, AOD), and second, the capacity to engage in goal-directed action in response to threatening experiences (threat-related action orientation, AOT) 1 . According to PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000) , threat and demand represent qualitatively different types of aversive affective states, each requiring a specific form of intuitive affect regulation.
In the present research, we administered two 12-item subscales of the ACS90, which respectively measure AOD and AOT. The items of both subscales were intermingled and presented in a different random order for each participant. Each of the items describes a stressful situation, and an action-oriented versus state-oriented way of coping with that situation. For each item, participants were asked to select the response Subliminal Affect Regulation 11 that best described their own reaction to that situation. An example item of the AOD subscale is "When I know that I must finish something soon: A. I have to push myself to get started. B. I find it easy to get it done and over with". An example item of the AOT subscale is "When I am being told that my work is completely unsatisfactory: A. I feel paralysed. B. I don't let it bother me for too long." In both example items, A represents a state-oriented response, and B represents an action-oriented response. Action-oriented responses were coded as "1", whereas state-oriented responses were coded as "0".
Scores were then summed for each subscale. Participants who gave 7 or more actionoriented responses on the AOD scale were classified as action-oriented (N = 45), whereas participants with less then 7 action-oriented responses were classified as stateoriented on that subscale (N = 47). An identical procedure was followed for the AOT scale, N = 34 vs. N = 58, respectively 2 .
A priori, we had no strong predictions on whether the subliminal priming procedure would primarily evoke effects of AOD or AOT. To the extent that the angry faces would be perceived as threatening (Öhman et al., 2001) , we would expect to find effects of AOT rather than AOD. However, the angry faces that were used in the present study had a closed mouth with a downward curve, whereas threat is much more strongly associated with an open mouth with bared teeth (Aronoff, Barclay, & Stevenson, 1988) . A closed mouth in a downward curve has been found to signal strong negativity but only moderate activity (Lundqvist, Esteves, & Öhman, 1999) . In view of these considerations, it seems possible that the angry faces would signal disapproval rather than threat, which would lead one to expect effects of AOD rather than AOT. In the remainder of this article, we will generally refer to the broader term "action orientation" rather than to its specific subcategories unless a more precise distinction is required for clarification.
